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McKillop: The Illinois Land Trust in Florida

THE ILLINOIS LAND TRUST IN FLORIDA
JA

s H. M cKILLOP II*

The Illinois type land trust, hereinafter referred to as the Illinois
trust or the land trust, was first hela to be valid in 1921 in Kerr v.
Kotz. 1 Since that time its use by owners of Illinois real estate for an
ever-increasing number of purposes has flourished.
The primary function of the Illinois trust is to facilitate the
transfer and financing of real estate holdings of relatively large value.
The Illinois courts have held that the trust provisions convert the
beneficial interest in trust real estate into personalty; hence the beneficial interest can be represented by trust certificates. These certificates can be assigned or pledged as collateral security with the facility
of corporate stock. The trustee is capable of passing title to the
trust real estate upon the written direction of the beneficiaries without
their joinder or that of their wives. The trust offers an escape from
certain corporate tax disadvantages, from dower, from public record
of beneficial ownership, from partition among the beneficiaries, and
from administration of estates in courts of the land's situs.2
With the advent of nation-wide speculation and investment in
Florida real estate, the Illinois trust inevitably has found increasing
acceptance in the state. The trust has been severely criticized as
invalid under present Florida trust law by many attorneys as well
as by the great bulk of reputable title insurers operating in the state.
This article attempts to shed some light upon the rationale of
-this hybrid trust and to analyze the positions of Illinois, Florida, and
other jurisdictions, so that the reader may more readily evaluate the
*trust's present tenuous position under Florida law. Notwithstanding
the criticisms lodged against the trust, Florida could be greatly bene•fited in the development of its bountiful real estate if such a trust
vehicle were made available by legislative enactment. Without legislation, however, use of the land trust in Florida is a legally hazardous
venture.
There are two basic documents involved in the Illinois land
*Graduate, Spring Semester 1960, College of Law, University of Florida.
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Professor Kenneth L.

Black, College of Law, University of Florida, in the preparation of this article.
1299 Il. 465, 132 N.E. 625 (1921), aff'g 218 Ill. App. 654 (1919).
2See 2 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §250 (1953); CAPLAN, LAND TRUSTS 12-14
(2d ed. 1958).
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trust, the deed in trust and the trust agreement. Under the deed in
trust 3 a corporation is named trustee and the deed is recorded. The

deed grants broad powers to the trustee to protect and conserve, to
sell and convey, to mortgage, to lease, and generally to deal with
the title as if he were the owner of the total estate. The deed also
provides that persons dealing with the trustee are relieved of any
obligation to require that the purchase money be applied in such
a way that the terms of the trust are complied with, or to inquire
into the authority or necessity of any act of the trustee. Third parties are not privileged to inquire as to the terms of the non-recorded
auxiliary document, the trust agreement, and it is explicitly provided that the instruments out of the trustee shall be conclusive
evidence in favor of third persons that the trustee acted within the
terms of the agreement. The interest of every beneficiary under
the trust is expressly declared to be only in the earnings and avails
of the property; it is stated to be personal property that carries no
legal or equitable title to the trust realty. The beneficiaries are not
named in the deed in trust.
The form of the non-recorded land trust agreement used in
Illinois is less verbose than the one used in Florida.4 The components
of each, however, are basically the same. The identity of the beneficiaries is disclosed, and the trustee's powers and duties are set
forth. The trustee is empowered to deal with the title to trust property only upon the written direction of the specified beneficiaries.3
As in the deed of trust, the beneficial interest of the cestui under
the trust agreement is declared to be in the avails and proceeds of
the property and not in the real estate; and the interest is expressly
designated as personal property.6 The trust agreement, however, imposes a number of additional prohibitions and duties upon the trustee.
Full and exclusive management and control of the handling of the
trust property are reserved to the beneficiaries. The trustee is expressly precluded from insuring the trust property out of trust
proceeds or paying taxes thereon or filing various tax reports.7 As an
3See CAPLAN, LAND TRUSTS 24 (2d ed. 1958).
41d. at 20.

sId. §3: "The trustee assumes and agrees to perform the following active and
affirmative duties hereunder: (a) To execute instruments: When and as directed
so to do by the following named person or persons: ..
6CAPLAN, LAND TRusTs 24 (2d ed. 1958).
71d. at 22, §5: "BENEFICIARIES MANAGE AND OPERATE TRUST PROPERTY: The beneficiaries shall in their own right, have full and exclusive control
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"active and affirmative duty," the trustee is expressly instructed to
sell any remaining trust property twenty years from the date of
execution of the trust, after giving reasonable notice to the beneficiaries. 8 The Florida form is reinforced by the imposition of various
other duties upon the corporate trustee, however. 9
Is THE TYPICAL ILLINOIS LAND TRUST ACTIVE oR PAssivE?

There does not appear to be any standard definition of an active
or a passive trust, but most of them run along the same lines. Pomeroy gives a characteristic definition:1 0
"An express private passive trust exists where land is conveyed to or held by A in trust for B, without any power expressly or impliedly given to A to take the actual possession of
the land, or to exercise acts of ownership over it, except by the
direction of B. The naked legal title only is vested in A, while
the equitable estate of the cestui que trust is to all intents the
beneficial ownership virtually equivalent in equity to the corresponding legal estate. Express private active . . . trusts are
those in which ... the trustees are charged with the performance of active and substantial duties in respect to the management of and dealing with the trust property for the benefit
of the cestui que trustent .... "
This definition, like those laid down by the Florida courts, is not
sufficiently detailed. The courts state generally the characteristics of
an active or a passive trust, but they are reticent about specifying in
which category a particular "duty" falls.
One of the arguments often raised against the Illinois land trust
is that it is a passive trust of realty and executed by the statute of
over the management and operation of the trust property and control of the
selling, renting and other handling and disposition thereof, and each beneficiary,
or his or her agent, shall collect and otherwise handle his or her share of the
rents and avails thereof and the proceeds of any sale or other disposition thereof,
and the trustee shall have no duty respecting the payment of taxes, insurance
premiums or other costs or charges against or concerning the trust property."
SCAPLAN, LAND TRUSTS 21, §3 (b)(1) (2d ed. 1958).
DId. §§3 (c)- (k).
101 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §153 (5th ed. 1941), cited in Elvins v.
Seestedt, 141 Fla. 266, 193 So. 54 (1940).
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uses. 1 The problem is apparent when one reads the broad powers
granted to the corporate trustees in the deed in trust 12 and compares
these powers with the restrictions imposed upon the trustee's ac3
tivities under the trust agreement.'
The duties of the trustee fall into the following categories: (1) the
duty to sell property remaining in trust twenty years from the date
of execution; (2) the duty to convey title to trust property upon
direction of the beneficiary; and (3) administrative duties, such as
the duty to pay over all income and proceeds, to pay ad valorem
taxes with funds from sources other than the trust, and other ministerial duties. Duties (1) and (2) are consistent in their appearance
in both the Illinois and Florida forms of land trust. The third category appears to be a Florida innovation inserted in an attempt to
make this type of trust acceptable under Florida law.
Duty to Sell Property
There is little authority on whether the duty to sell twenty years
from date is an active or a passive provision. In Illinois the courts
have been reasonably consistent in holding that this duty is active.1
In Masters v. Smythe," however, it was held that the duty to sell
property remaining in trust twenty years was insufficient to make the
trust active. Although the Masters case has not been reversed, there
are some features that distinguish it from the other Illinois cases that
uphold this type of trust.- The party seeking partition was the settlor of the trust, who had power to effectuate the same result by other
means. In the other cases partition could be accomplished only
through the courts. The trustee was expressly prohibited from exercising any control over the property aside from selling it twenty years
after date, while in the other cases the courts found that the trustees
had certain "managerial" or "active" duties to perform. The trust
did not expressly provide that the interest of the beneficiary would be
"See,

e.g., Crow v. Crow, 348 Ill. 241, 180 N.E. 877 (1932); Masters v. Smythe,

342 Ill. App. 185, 95 N.E.2d 719 (1950); Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Mercantile
Trust 8: Say. Bank, 300 Ill. App. 329, 20 N.E.2d 992 (1939).
"See

CAPLAN,

LAND TRUSiS

24 (2d ed. 1958).

13Id. at 20.
14E.g., Breen v. Breen, 411 Ill. 206, 103 N.E.2d 625 (1952); Crow v. Crow.
supra note 11; Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Mercantile Trust & Say. Bank, supra

note 11.
"342 I1. App. 185, 95 N.E.2d 719 (1950).
I,E.g., cases cited note 14 supra; see CAI'LAN, LAND TRUSTS 50
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considered personalty, whereas each of the other cases did so provide.
The Illinois courts do not give a reason for finding the duty to
sell to be active. But in the Masters case the court held the trust
to be passive because it was completely subject to the control of
the beneficiary with the exception of the single ministerial act of
selling the trust res if any should exist after twenty years. The
Illinois court apparently frowned upon retention by the beneficiary
of every vestige of control and ownership, and felt that there was
no equitable reason for the division of legal and equitable title.
There is even less authority in other jurisdictions. A Wisconsin
case involving a similar instrument has held that when the only
duty imposed upon the trustee is to sell the trust res after twenty
years, the trust is passive.17
The Florida courts have not had occasion to decide this point,
so the courts' attitude in construing trusts in general must be relied
on. In Elvins v. Seestedt, 8 the Supreme Court quotes Pomeroy to
the effect that a passive trust is one in which naked legal title is placed
in the trustee and equitable title in the beneficiary, without any
power given to the trustee to take actual possession of the land or
to exercise acts of ownership over it except by direction of the beneficiary. 19 Pomeroy concludes that the beneficiary has all the incidents
of ownership "virtually equivalent in equity to the corresponding
legal estate." The Court also cites Pomeroy for the proposition that
the passive use under the common law imposed three duties upon
the trustees: (1) The trustee must allow the beneficiary to receive
the profits; (2) the trustee must, upon the request of the beneficiary,
convey the estate to the beneficiary or his heirs or to any other person upon the beneficiary's direction; (3) the trustee must protect
the beneficiary's right to possession. These passive duties are inserted in express terms in the land trust. Mere explicit stipulation
of these duties should not make the trust active. The Elvins case is
an indication of how the "duty to sell" clause will be treated in
Florida, but it does not settle the question whether the Illinois land
trust is active or passive.
There have been two opinions rendered by the Attorney General
of Florida as to the nature of the cestui que trust's interest under
a typical Illinois land trust. In considering whether the cestui's in17Janura v. Fend, 261 Wis. 179, 52 N.W.2d 144 (1952); see IA BOGERT,

TRUSTS

AND TRUSTEES 283-84 (1951).

18141 Fla. 266, 193 So. 54 (1940).
291d. at 272, 193 So. at 57.
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terest is in real or personal property, 2° the Attorney General cited the
Masters case. 21 He concluded that since the Florida form was adapted
from one used in Illinois, the construction by the Illinois court is
entitled to great weight in this state. Less than two years later, in
determining whether the res of the land trust was realty or personalty,
he stated:
"We .

22

.

. feel that the Florida court would follow like or simi-

lar rules as those announced in such cases. We are inclined to
think that the Florida courts would hold the interest of the
beneficiary in trust instruments like, or similar to, those
handed us .

.

. where the beneficiary is or was not residing on

the property and making same his or her permanent home with
the bank exercising no active duties in connection with the
trust estate, to be personal property in accordance with the
above Illinois cases."
It appears that the Attorney General feels that the Florida Court
will follow the Illinois view. If this is the case, not only the duty
to sell at the termination date of the trust but also most of the
other duties imposed on the trustee will be held to be active and
the land trust will be valid in Florida. The Illinois view, however,
seems to be out of character wtih Florida's traditional application
of trust concepts. A provision to sell the res of a trust that would
otherwise be passive should not make the trust active when the purpose of the provision is to avoid violation of the rule against perpetuities by providing a definite termination date. If the trustee is
to perform no active duty in the interim, the trust should be held
passive.

Duty to Convey upon Direction
There is more authority construing the duty to convey upon
direction of the beneficiary than on the duty to sell property remaining in trust twenty years from the date of execution, but again it is
200P. ATr'Y GEN. FLA. 055-18 (Jan. 28, 1955).

2"Masters v. Smythe, 342 Ill. App. 185, 95 N.E.2d 719 (1950). This case held
the trust to be passive; accord, Janura v. Fend, 261 Wis. 179, 52 N.W.2d 144
(1952).
22OP. ATT'v GEN. FLA. 056-271

(Aug. 31, 1956).

23See Masters v. Smythe, supra note 21.
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divided. Scott states that by the weight of authority the duty to
2 4
convey on direction is sufficient in itself to make a trust active.
Pomeroy, however, feels that the passive trustee owes the cestui certain obligations, among which is included the duty to convey upon
the request of the beneficiary.2 5 If the Florida Court follows Pomeroy,
as it did in the Elvins case, the inevitable conclusion will be that
the duty to convey on direction is passive and that the mere expression of a passive duty will not activate an otherwise passive trust.
26
Illinois holds the duty to convey on direction to be active.
Aside from those cases dealing specifically with this duty, there are
other Illinois trust cases containing the "duty to convey on direction"
clause along with other ministerial duties that have been held to be
active without specific discussion.27
28
It has been argued that Florida will follow the Illinois doctrine
on the basis of the following statement made by the Supreme Court
in the Elvins case while discussing the efficacy of the Florida statute
of uses: "It appears that our statute of uses ... should be construed
as having like application to a trust agreement of the sort which we
have under consideration here as was applied by the Illinois court
in the Newcomb case." 29 Newcomb v. Masters 0 however, dealt with
a passive testamentary trust which the Illinois court found to be executed by the statute of uses. Reference to this case by the Florida
Court does not seem to carry a strong inference as to Florida's position.
AdministrativeDuties
The aforementioned duties are those most discussed in litigation
concerning the Illinois land trust; but, in an effort to override ob241 ScOrr, TRUSTS §69.1 (2d ed. 1956); see cases cited. See also RESTATEMENT,
TRUSTS §69 (1935). But see 54 Am.JUR., Trusts §14 (1945) and cases cited.
253 PomERoY,EQUITy JURISPRUDENcE 2125 (5th ed. 1941).
26E.g., Crow v. Crow, 348 I1. 241, 180 N.E. 877 (1932); Emery v. Emery, 325 Ill.
212, 156 N.E. 364 (1927); Kurzawski v. Malaga, 338 Ill.
App. 182, 86 N.E.2d 898
(1949); Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Mercantile Trust & Say. Bank, 300 Ill. App.
329, 20 N.E.2d 992 (1939); see 1 Scorr, TRUSTS §69.1 for other citations.
27E.g., Breen v. Breen, 411 Ill. 206, 103 N.E.2d 625 (1952); Berning v. Berning,
320 Ill.
App. 686, 51 N.E.2d 997 (1943). But see Masters v. Smythe, 342 Ill. App.
185, 95 N.E.2d 719 (1950), in which this particular duty was not enough in itself
to render the trust active.
2SThis is the argument propounded by Caplan in LAND TRUSTS 45-46 (2d ed.
1958).
29Elvins v. Seestedt, 141 Fla. 266, 274, 193 So. 54, 58 (1940).
30287 Ill. 26, 122 N.E. 85 (1919).
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jections to this trust in Florida, some miscellaneous "managerial"
duties have been added. 31 It seems that the passive or active character
of these duties should depend upon the necessity of the trustee's
3 2
retention of the legal title in order to accomplish valid trust purposes.
A popular Florida version of the Illinois land trust 33 states that
the right to control of trust property and the right to collect and
handle rents and avails are expressly reserved to the beneficiaries of
the trust. A distinction must be drawn between a devise or deed to
a person to collect and pay over rents and profits to another and a
deed or devise in trust that permits another to enjoy the rents and
profits. 34 The latter is usually deemed to be a dry trust and executed
into a legal estate in the beneficiary. 5 The distinguishing factor
between these two trusts is the trustee's active duty in the former to
apply, distribute, and apportion the rents and profits in accordance
with the directions of the trust 6 Under the Illinois land trust the
trustee is specifically precluded from handling any income derived
from the beneficiaries' transactions in connection with the trust real
estate. The Florida trustee, when required to make an outlay for
taxes or insurance, is not permitted to make payment out of the trust
res or income; 37 the beneficiaries are expressly required to furnish
these funds. The trustee does not need to retain legal title for the
performance of these duties. Under these circumstances the trust will
probably be held to be passive and executed because of the absence
of a duty upon the trustee to hold title for the purpose of collecting,
38
applying, and distributing rents and profits.
It has been suggested that the inclusion of a duty upon the corporate trustee to procure and pay all tax and special assessment bills
and charges against real estate held by the trustee with funds pro-

31CAPLAN, LAND TRusTs 21, §§3 (c)-(k) (2d ed. 1958).

32See Elvins v. Seestedt, supra note 29, citing Kay v. Scates, 37 Pa. 31, 78 Am.
Dec. 399 (1860); Jones v. Jones, 223 Mo. 424, 123 S.W. 29 (1909); People's Loan &
Exch. Bank v. Garlington, 54 S.C. 413, 32 S.E. 513 (1899).
33CAPLAN, LAND TRUSTS 21, §§3 (c)- (k) (2d ed. 1958).
34
Ware v. Richardson, 3 Md. 505, 56 Am. Dec. 762 (1853); 54 AM. JUR., Trusts
§14 (1945).
3rSee 54 AM. JUR., Trusts §14 (1945), and cases cited n.13.
3
6Carpenter v. Cook, 132 Cal. 621, 64 Pac. 997 (1901); Eldred v. Meek, 183 Ill.
26, 55 N.E. 536 (1899); Barnett's Appeal, 46 Pa. St. 392, 86 Am. Dec. 502 (1864);
see 26 R.C.L., Trusts 1177 (1920).
37See CAPLAN, LAND TRus'rs 21, §3 (k), 22, §5.
3SSee 26 R.C.L., Trusts 1175 and cases cited.
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vided by the beneficiaries of the trust would make the trust active.39
There is no necessity for the trustee to have legal title merely to pay
taxes, however, since an agent or a stranger could do the same.40
Hence, according to the prevailing view, 41 the trust would be considered passive.
The Florida modification of the Illinois form of land trust often
contains the following miscellaneous managerial duties: (1) to furnish information concerning taxes and assessments, (2) to keep
records of trust, (3) to prepare fiduciary reports, (4) to establish
proof of heirship, and (5) to submit terminal accounting. As with
the duty to pay taxes, these duties fall in the passive category by
orthodox trust law, since they entail no necessity for retention of
the legal title by the trustee in order to secure their performance.
Illinois, on the other hand, has taken a liberal approach to the
active requirements for a subsisting trust - witness its rulings on the
duty to sell on termination and the duty to convey on direction.42
The Illinois courts hold that as long as "active" duties are imposed,
regardless of their merely formal or ministerial nature, the trust is
active and outside the operation of the statute of uses. 43 Thus in
Hart v. Seymour"4 the Illinois Supreme Court stated that when, by
the terms of the trust agreement, title to the land is vested in the
trustee for management and distribution, the trust is active and not
affected by the statute of uses even though the beneficiaries are
authorized to direct and control the actions of the trustee and to
remove the trustee and substitute another. Florida has a virtual
vacuum with respect to the passive or active nature of these "duties,"
with the exception of Elvins v. Seestedt, discussed supra under "Duty
to Convey upon Direction." It is submitted, however, that the Elvins
case does not purport to indicate that Florida will follow Illinois in
its liberal attitude toward active trust duties. The Florida Court's
39See CAPLAN, LAND TRUsTs 21, §3 (c), (d).
4026 R.C.L., Trusts 1174-75 (1920). See also Jones v. Jones, 223 Mo. 424, 123
S.W. 29 (1909).
42See 54 Am. JUR., Trusts §13 (1945), and cases cited n.16.
42Crow v. Crow, 348 Ill. 241, 180 N.E. 877 (1932); Masters v. Mayers, 246 Ill.
506, 92 N.E. 945 (1910); Silverman v. Kirstufek, 162 Ill. 222, 44 N.E. 430 (1896);
Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Mercantile Trust & Sav. Bank, 300 I1. App. 329, 20
N.E.2d 992 (1939).
43Crow v. Crow, supra note 42; Oppenheim v. Scully, 337 Ill. App. 587, 86
N.E.2d 431 (1949); Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Mercantile Trust & Say. Bank,
supra note 42.
44147 Il1. 598, 35 N.E. 246 (1893).
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reference to the Illinois view was in the context of a clearly passive
trust of realty that is executed by the statute of uses; not only Illinois
but also the great bulk of American jurisdictions hold such trusts
to be dry and executed by the statute. 45 It may be concluded that in
the absence of a more positive indication that the Florida Court has
changed its position, miscellaneous duties such as those discussed will
not make a trust active.
IS A PASSIVE TRUST OF REALTY EXECUTED?

Most jurisdictions have adopted the statute of uses in one form or
another, by statutory adoption of the English common law and
statutes, by decision, or by statutory revision.46 Florida has adopted
the English statutes and common law consistent with its form of
government, 47 and also has a specific statute dealing with the execu-

tion of certain forms of deeds. 4 8 Illinois has a substantial re-enactment
of that part of the English statute of uses that relates to conveyances. 49 There are a few jurisdictions that do not recognize the statute
of uses,5 0 but in most of them passive trusts have been abolished. 51
Generally, therefore, when a trust beneficiary obtains the whole
beneficial use and management of an estate and the trustee has no
active duty to perform, the trust will fail and full title will pass to the
52
beneficiary by force of the statute of uses.
Although the law seems to be well settled in Illinois that the land
trust is active and hence not executed by the statute of uses, Masters
v. Smythe recognizes the applicability of the statute when the trust
is passive. Since the land trust is a relatively new trust device, there
has been little case law on it in other jurisdictions. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court, however, has considered the land trust. In a suit for
45See 54 Am. JUR., Trusts §12 (1945).
4GSee Annot., 16 L.R.A. 1148 (N.S.) (1908).
47FLA. STAT. §2.01 (1959).
4SFLA. STAT. §689.01 (1959).
49ILL. ANN.

STAT.

ch. 30, §3 (Smith-Hurd 1935).

501n re Fair's Estate, 132 Cal. 523, 60 Pac. 442 (1900), rev'd, 132 Cal. 580, 64
Pac. 1000 (1901); Blake v. O'Neal, 63 W. Va. 483, 61 S.E. 410 (1908); see Note, 78
Am. Dec. 409 (1886).

5iSee 26 R.C.L., Trusts 1172, §7 (1920).
5?2E.g., Gindrat v. Western Ry., 96 Ala. 162, 11 So. 372 (1891); Glover v. Condell, 163 111. 566, 45 N.E. 173 (1896); Snelling v. Lamar, 32 S.C. 72, 10 S.E. 825
(1890); Sims v. Sims, 94 Va. 580, 27 S.E. 436 (1897).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol13/iss2/2

10

McKillop: The Illinois Land Trust in Florida
THE ILLINOIS LAND TRUST
partition,53 the cestui under an Illinois land trust argued that the
trust was passive and that under the Wisconsin statutes 4 the trust
was executed, with legal title vesting in him. The Wisconsin court
held the trust to be passive and executed, and refused to allow a
provision referring to the trust as one of personalty to affect the
result.
Florida seems to follow the generally accepted view as to the
applicability of the statute of uses to a passive trust. 55 Thus, if it
is determined that under Florida law the Illinois land trust is a
passive trust of realty, it will be executed and full legal title will
be placed in the beneficiary.
REALTY OR PERSONALTY?

The problem of realty versus personalty is of key importance to
the question of the validity of the Illinois land trust in Florida. If
it is held to be a trust of personalty the majority view is that a passive trust of personalty is not affected by the statute of uses. 56 The
subject of the applicability of the statute to personalty and analogies
thereto will be discussed later. The present section will deal with
the several theories used by the Illinois courts to convert realty to
personalty, the national views on these theories, and what Florida
law there is on the point.
The Illinois view is illustrated by Chicago Title & Trust Co. v.
Mercantile Trust & Savings Bank, in which an appellate court, after
reciting the provisions of an Illinois land trust to the effect that the
57
beneficial interest should be deemed personalty, held:
"The rule has been long and well established in this state
that the form of deed of trust and trust agreement before us
creates a valid and subsisting trust under which the interest
of the beneficiary is personal property only and not real
estate."
This "long and well established" rule is the result of several lines
r3janura v. Fend, 261 Wis. 179, 52 N.W.2d 144 (1952).
54WIS. STAT. §§231.05,14 (1957).
5.McGriff v. McGill, 62 So.2d 28 (Fla. 1952); Elvins v. Seestedt, 141 Fla. 266, 193

So. 54 (1940).
56See 1 ScOrr,

TRUSTS §70 (2d ed. 1956).
57300 111. App. 329, 336, 20 N.E.2d 992, 995 (1939).
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of Illinois cases dealing with the nature of a partner's interest in
land transactions for profit only, the conversion of realty to personalty
through the doctrine of equitable conversion, and the conversion of
the beneficial interest under the land trust by force of agreement and
intent of the parties to the trust.
a. Transactionsfor Profits Only
In Illinois it frequently has been held that an agreement creating
an interest in the proceeds, avails, and profits of the sale of realty
creates no lien upon or interest in the land itself.5 8 In Morrill v. Colehour,59 in which land was purchased by several persons for the purpose of sale and acquisition of profits only and not for permanent use,
the Illinois Supreme Court held that the interest among the partners
in the speculation was regarded in equity as personalty. Similarly,
in Roby v. Colehour60 the court held that when an owner of land
declares himself to hold land in trust for the purpose of dividing
net profits derived from the sale of the land, the beneficiaries take no
interest in or title to the land itself but only an interest in the profits.
The court reasoned that the relationship of the parties was in essence
one of partnership and applied the rule of the Morrill case. It thus
appears, according to the Illinois courts, that the key factor in determining whether the interest of the parties in the profit-sharing
context is realty or personalty is the intent of the parties as determined by the terms of the contract. 61 Apparently the Illinois courts
now apply this theory to the Illinois land trust as one rationale for
62
finding a conversion of the trust res from realty to personalty.
b. Personalty by Express Agreement
In the great bulk of the Illinois cases dealing with the land trust
the courts fail to specify the theory upon which they found their de58E.g., MacDonald v. Dexter, 234 Ill. 517, 85 N.E. 209 (1908); Roby v. Colehour,
infra note 60; Morrill v, Colehour, infra note 59.
5982 Ill. 618 (1876).
60135 Ill. 300, 25 N.E. 777 (1890).
GIE.g., MacDonald v. Dexter, supra note 58; Ingrahain v. Mariner, 194 Ill. 269,
62 N.E. 609 (1901); Van Housen v. Copeland, 180 Ill. 74, 54 N.E. 169 (1899);
Boone v. Clarke, 129 111. 466, 21 N.E. 850 (1889).
62See Chicago Title 9- Trust Co. v. Mercantile Trust & Say. Bank, 300 Ill. App.
329, 20 N.E.2d 992 (1939).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol13/iss2/2

12

McKillop: The Illinois Land Trust in Florida
THE ILLINOIS LAND TRUST
cision that the beneficial interest in the rents, proceeds, and avails of
the trust property is personalty rather than realty. They usually
recite the express trust agreement provision to the effect that the
beneficial interest is personalty and then state that such a provision
has been repeatedly held to be personalty.63 They place great emphasis on the fact that the parties agree and stipulate that their interest shall be personalty. Here, as in the area of transactions for
profits only, this expression of intent seems to be the basis for holding the beneficiaries' interest to be personalty. The question whether
realty can be converted to personalty by mere agreement does not
appear to have been discussed, but it can be inferred from reading
a few cases that the Illinois courts are saying "it's personalty because
the parties say it is personalty." For example, in the first case
litigated on the Illinois land trust as it is known today,64 the Illinois
Supreme Court held that when the deed of trust expressly provides
that it is the intent of the parties that both legal and equitable title
to the land be vested in the trustee and that the beneficial interest
be personalty, the beneficial interest is deemed to be personalty and
therefore a judgment against the beneficiary is not a lien on the land
in trust. Notwithstanding this liberal view, there is a great deal of
doubt whether conversion can be accomplished by agreement alone if
the courts refuse to apply the doctrine of equitable conversion.65
National Views
Although the Illinois courts have repeatedly held that an agreement creating an interest in profits or proceeds of the sale of real
estate creates no interest in or lien upon the land itself, it should
be observed that the courts were dealing with agreements that partook of the nature of partnerships and joint ventures. The legal
nature and incidents of land purchased by a partnership with partnership funds is a subject on which there is a diversity of opinion in
other jurisdictions. Under the English doctrine realty intended by
partners to be part of the partnership property becomes converted
into personalty ipso facto for all purposes. 66 The American view,
63E.g., Homey v. Hayes, 11 II. 2d 178, 142 N.E.2d 94 (1957); Aronson v.
Olson, 348 Ill. 26, 180 N.E. 565 (1932); Sweesy v. Hoy, 524 Il1. 319, 155 N.E. 323
(1927); Duncanson v. Lill, 322 Il. 528, 153 N.E. 618 (1926).
64Kerr v. Kotz, 299 Il1.465, 132 N.E. 625 (1921), aff'g 218 Ill. App. 654 (1919).
0sSee 2 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §250 (1953).

66Lang's Heirs v. Haring, 25 Ala. 625, 60 Am. Dec. 533 (1854); Darrow v. Cal-
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however, supports the rule that in the absence of any express or
implied agreement between the partners to the contrary, partnership
realty retains its character as realty, with all the incidents of that
species of property, except that it is open for the payment of partnership debts. But if the partners agree that it is their intention to hold
lands as partnership stock, or personalty, the land must be treated
67
as such in all respects by courts of equity.
The Illinois land trust agreement provides that the instrument
shall not create or evidence a corporation, a partnership, or a joint
venture, but rather that the agreement shall be deemed to create
only a common law trust.6 8 The Massachussetts courts have decided
a few cases dealing with trusts in which partnership principles were
0
involving a trust in which a syndiapplied.69 In Dana v. Treasurer7
cate took over a factory, issued certificates of ownership, and provided that the beneficial interest was in the trust res and that the
trust was to terminate twenty-one years from date, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court held that the provisions created a partnership. Thus
the provision for ultimate conversion at the end of twenty-one years
was deemed to convert from the time of execution of the trust agreement. In view of the fact that a common law trust and a partnership
are distinct legal entities, it might reasonably be concluded that
Illinois has extracted partnership principles from their proper context and has applied them to trusts.
c. Personalty by Equitable Conversion
In the Chicago Title & Trust Co. case, 71 in discussing a judgment
against a beneficiary of a typical Illinois land trust, the court observed
that it frequently has been held in Illinois that when an equitable
conversion is accomplished in a trust a judgment against the beneficiary is not a lien on the land but only a claim to the proceeds of
kins, 154 N.Y. 503, 49 N.E. 61 (1897); see 6 R.C.L., Conversion and Reconversion
1082 (1915); Annot., 37 L.R.A. (N.s.) 900 (1912).
67Bates v. Babcock, 95 Cal. 479, 30 Pac. 605 (1892); Nicoll v. Ogden, 29 Il1. 323,
81 Am. Dec. 311 (1862); Buckley v. Doig, 188 N.Y. 238, 80 N.E. 913 (1907); see 6
R.C.L., Converison and Reconversion 1083 (1915).
GSSee CAPLAN, LAND TRUsTS 21, §4 (2d ed. 1958).

69Priestly v. Treasurer, 250 Mass. 452, 120 N.E. 100 (1918); Dana v. Treasurer,
infra note 70.
70227 Mass. 562, 116 N.E. 941 (1917).

7iChicago Title &-Trust Co. v. Mercantile Trust & Say. Bank, 300 Il1. App. 329,
20 N.E.2d 992 (1939).
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sale, because an equitable conversion transforms the cestui's equitable
interest in land into an interest in personalty. The court relied upon
the Illinois cases of Lash v. Lash72 and Moll v. Gardner.73 In the
Lash case the Supreme Court held that when a will directs the sale
of lands and division of the proceeds among designated persons after
the termination of an intervening life estate, the will effects an
equitable conversion of the land into money and the bequests of
the proceeds of sale should be regarded as bequests of personal property. The court reasoned that the direction to sell the
land was positive and absolute. The fact that the sale did not occur
until death of the life tenant did not prevent a conversion. Both
the Lash and the Moll cases, however, dealt with testamentary trusts
that ordered the trustee to sell the lands and distribute the proceeds.
Under this set of circumstances the conversion is deemed to take effect
on the effective date of the devise, which is the date of the testator's
74

death.

In most of the cases dealing with the nature of the cestui's interest,
the Illinois courts do not make direct reference to the doctrine of
equitable conversion but merely state that, by the express provision
and intent of the parties, the interest of the cestui is personalty.75
There are a few cases, on the other hand, that do refer directly to
the doctrine.76 Breen v. Breen- involved a suit for partition by a
beneficiary under a land trust in which the trust agreement provided
that the beneficial interest was personalty and that the trustee was
under a duty to sell any remaining trust property twenty years from
date. The Illinois Supreme Court held that under the trust instrument there was an equitable conversion. The court probably felt
that the duty to sell twenty years from the date of execution of the
trust agreement was a sufficient reason for finding a conversion, although the rationale of the decision was not clearly expressed. The
Breen case arose after the date of termination specified in the trust,
however. Since the time for sale had arisen, the doctrine of equitable
conversion should have applied, because the "ought" of the equity
72209 IlL. 595, 70 N.E. 1049 (1904).
73214 Il1. 248, 73 N.E. 442 (1905).
74See 3 POMERoY, EQUITy JURISPRUDENCE §1162 (5th ed. 1941).
75E.g., Aronson v. Olson, 348 11. 26, 180 N.E. 565 (1932); Sweesy v. Hoy, 324
Ill. 319, 155 N.E. 323 (1927); Duncanson v. LilI, 322 Ill. 528, 153 N.E. 618 (1926).
76E.g., Breen v. Breen, 411 Ill. 206, 103 N.E.2d 625 (1952); Chicago Title &
Trust Co. v. Mercantile Trust & Say. Bank, 300 Ill. App. 329, 20 N.E.2d 992 (1917).
77411 Ill.
206, 103 N.E.2d 625 (1952).
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maxim - equity treats that as done which ought to be done - was
78
present.
An Illinois case holding the beneficiary's interest to be personalty
for the purpose of the sale and division of profits has been cited as
an application of the doctrine of equitable conversion. 9 It has been
held that, by the nature of the transaction, the declaration of trust
creates a joint venture 0 or a partnership,8 ' under which the realty
partakes of the nature of personalty.8 2 It appears questionable, however, whether these cases should be applicable to the land trust, in
view of the fact that the land trust specifically provides that the
trust is not to be construed as anything other than a common law
83

trust.

National Views
According to Pomeroy, equitable conversion may be defined as
"that change in the nature of property by which, for certain purposes, real estate is considered as personal, and personal estates as real,
and transmissible and descendable as such." 84 In order to have a conversion it is essential that the trustee be under a clear and imperative
duty or direction to sell. The direction may arise by necessary implication as well as by express declaration.85
Since the Illinois land trust contains an imperative duty to sell
trust property remaining twenty years after inception, the question
is not whether there is to be a conversion of the real estate into
personalty but whether the conversion will be deemed to occur at the
time of the instrument's execution or at the time for actual sale.86
Illinois holds that the conversion occurs at the time of execution.878See Baker v. Commissioner, 253 Mass. 130, 148 N.E. 593 (1925); 3 PoMRoY
§§1160, 1162.
79Gordon v. Gordon, 6 Ii. 2d 572, 129 N.E.2d 706 (1955) citing Dicus v. Sherer,
infra note 80.
168, 115 N.E. 161 (1917).
8ODicus v. Scherer, 277 Ill.
siNicoll v. Mason, 49 III. 358 (1868).
8
'-2See also cases cited note 58 supra.
83
See CAPLAN, LAND TRUsrs 21, §4 (2d ed. 1958).
843 POMEROY 2305.
SsHaward v. Peavey, 128 Ill. 430, 21 N.E. 503 (1889); Beaver v. Ross, 140 Iowa
154, 118 N.V. 287 (1908); see 18 C.J.S., Conversion §§11-12 (1939).
s6See, e.g., Berning v. Berning, 320 Ill.
App. 686, 51 N.E.2d 997 (1943); Chicago
App. 329, 20 N.E.2d 992
Title & Trust Co. v. Mercantile Trust & Say. Bank, 300 Ill.
(1939); Baker v. Commissioner, 253 Mass. 130, 148 N.E. 593 (1925).
8sSee Dicus v. Sherer, 277 Il1. 168, 115 N.E. 161 (1917); Nicoll v. Mason, 49
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Pomeroy says that the time of conversion in wills takes place at the
death of the testator and in deeds and other inter vivos instruments
at the date of execution. He states further, however:8 8
"The instrument might in express terms contain an absolute
direction to sell . . . at some specified future time; and if it
created a trust to sell upon the happening of a specified event,
which might or might not happen, then the conversion would
only take place from the time of the happening of that event,
but would take place when the event happened exactly as
though there had been an absolute direction to sell at that
time."
Under this rule, when the land trust agreement imposes a duty
on the trustee to convey upon the direction of the beneficiary, is this
such an imperative duty that it would work an equitable conversion
at the time of execution? It would not appear so, since this duty is
contingent upon the beneficiary's written direction to convey. When
the power to sell is discretionary or contingent, the settled rule is
that no conversion takes place until there is an actual sale or the contingency occurs.89 The duty to convey upon direction of the beneficiary, aside from being contingent, is not necessarily synonymous
with the duty to sell on direction. It is possible that the beneficiary
could command the trustee to convey to the beneficiary himself for
no monetary consideration. If this were the case there would be no
conversion even if there were a conveyance.
Authority as to whether the duty to sell any property remaining
in trust twenty years from date works an equitable conversion from
the time of the execution of the trust agreement is sparse and divergent. It has been argued 90 that the trust provisions work an
equitable conversion not only on the authority of Illinois cases but
also by virtue of the Massachusetts decisions of Priestly v. Treasurer-'
and Dana v. Treasurer.92 The Priestly case involved a succession-tax
Ill. 358 (1868).
883 PoMERoy 2311-12. See Massey v. Modawell, 73 Ala. 421 (1882); Bank of
Ukiah v. Rice, 143 Cal. 265, 76 Pac. 1020 (1904); Keller v. Harper, 64 Md. 74, 1
At. 65 (1885).
89E.g., Elliott v. Loftin, 160 N.C. 294, 76 S.E. 236 (1912); Wheless v. Wheless,
92 Tenn. 293, 21 S.W. 595 (1893); Ford v. Ford, 70 Wis. 19, 33 N.W. 188 (1887).
90CAPLAN, LAND TRusTs 18 (2d ed. 1958).

91230 Mass. 452, 120 N.E. 100 (1918).
92227 Mass. 562, 116 N.E. 941 (1917).
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problem. Non-resident owners of shares in a Massachusetts land
trust were being taxed by the non-domiciliary state. The beneficial
interests were represented by transferable shares, the res was a fund
of realty and personalty, and there was an express provision that
the beneficial interest was personalty. The court held that the
beneficiaries were technically the equivalent of partners and that
since a partner's interest is deemed personalty, the beneficiaries'
interest was also personalty. In the Dana case, discussed previously,
conversion was deemed to occur from the date of the trust agreement.
The trusts considered in these cases can be distinguished from the
Florida form of land trust by the latter's express foreclosure of any
93
possibility of construing the trust as a partnership.
A great deal of light has been shed on the question by the Massachusetts case of Baker v. Commissioner,94 which dealt with a trust
formed by a group of real property owners for the purpose of rental,
lease, and conservation of the property. Their beneficial interests were
represented by trust certificates, and the trust agreement provided
that the interests should be deemed personal property. Each shareholder had the right to an undivided interest in the income derived
from the trust but was expressly declared to have no right in or to
the land held in trust and no right to partition. At the end of
certain lives in being plus twenty years the trust was to be terminated
by the trustee and the funds, construed to be the proceeds from liquidation, distributed to the beneficiaries. Massachusetts wanted to tax
the beneficial interest as an interest in land lying within that state.
The beneficiaries claimed that the beneficial interest was personalty
and taxable only in the domiciliary state, not realty taxable by the
state of the land's situs. The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that
the time when an equitable conversion takes place depends on the
terms of the particular instrument under consideration and the intent expressed therein, and that when the parties specify a definite
time for the conversion to take place it does not occur until the time
arrives. To accelerate the time of conversion from the future to the
present is outside the proper bounds of the doctrine of equitable conversion; and the provision in the trust instrument that the shares
shall be personal property, whatever may be its effect in showing
the intent of the parties, cannot rightly be construed as converting
land in the hands of the trustee into personal property.
21, §4 (2d ed. 1958).
94253 Mass. 130, 148 N.E. 593 (1925).
93See CAPLAN, LAND TRUSTS
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The trust under consideration in the Baker case is extremely
similar to the Illinois land trust, with the exception that in the Baker
case the trustee had active duties of management and distribution of
net proceeds. The Illinois courts seem to have overlooked or ignored
this exception to the general rule that there is no equitable conversion from the date of execution when the agreement specifies a future
date for sale. The Baker case does not stand alone in its position
on the doctrine of equitable conversion and on the efficacy of the
duty to sell on termination date. 95 Other cases also draw a distinction between an absolute duty to sell and convert that is present from
the execution of the instrument, or its effective date, and the duty to
convert at the end of some specified period or for purposes of termination of the trust. When the duty is to sell at a specified date it is not,
in effect, a present duty; hence there is no premise upon which a
court can correctly apply the doctrine of equitable conversion.
The doctrine, which is an intent-effectuating device, should be
applied only to carry out the intent of the settlor to sell and convert
realty to personalty absolutely, but not to give effect to the mere intent that the beneficial interest be considered personalty. What is
the intent of the parties under the Illinois land trust? Examination
of a typical trust 96 reveals that the object of the trust is to hold and
preserve property until its sale or other disposal. In reality this type of
trust is being used io serve many functions, such as to finance the
purchase of expensive realty, to hold title for the purpose of deriving
rental income, to secure loans, to avoid dower, to avoid taxes, to hold
title for value speculation, to develop and subdivide large parcels of
land, and to secrete title.0 7 In view of the purposes served by the
Illinois trust, do the parties intend an absolute and unconditional
sale of the real property held in trust, or is the duty to sell remaining trust property at the end of twenty years imposed in order that
the trust may not be voided by the rule against perpetuities? Illinois
has apparently taken the position that, by agreement and the application of the doctrine of equitable conversion, the parties can maintain control over the trust res and yet not have legal title because
the passive trust of "personalty" is not executed.
Can the parties control the nature of the beneficiaries' interest by
OsSee, e.g., Masters v. Smythe, 342 Ill. App. 185, 95 N.E.2d 719 (1950); Wheless
v. Wheless, 92 Tenn. 293, 21 S.W. 595 (1893); Janura v. Fend, 261 Wis. 179, 52
N.W.2d 144 (1952).
96CAPLAN, LAND TRUSTS 21, §4 (2d ed. 1958).
97See 2 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §250 (1953); CAPLAN 50.
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an agreement that this interest shall be deemed personalty? Bogert
says that "these clauses have been given their intended effect. They
are in their essence applications of the doctrine of equitable conversion, it would seem." 98 He also observes: 99
"The exact status of these real estate trusts will remain somewhat dubious until the courts have determined the nature of
the interest of the cestuis, both in the case where there is no
express provision and where there is a direct effort to have
such interests regarded as personalty .... Except as the doctrine

of equitable conversion can be applied, it seems extremely
dubious whether the parties can control the question by agreement."
An analysis of the cases holding the interest of the cestui to be
personalty when the trust instruments so stipulate bears out Bogert's
observation that they are in essence an application of the doctrine
of equitable conversion, but the courts make no specific mention of
the doctrine. For example, in Smith v. Bank of America0° the landowners executed a trust agreement pursuant to an arrangement with
certain subdividers which designated the subdividers as beneficiaries
and their interests as personalty. The beneficiaries were obligated to
discharge taxes and liens. The trustee was given the power to sell and
release lots and to sell the beneficial interests on default. The question was raised whether the beneficial interests under the trust were
personal property. The California appellate court held that under
the California Civil Code' 0 1 a trust agreement vests the whole legal
and equitable estate in the trustee. It held further that the beneficiaries' interest must be personalty because, as against the trustee
and those claiming under him, the beneficiary has no interest in
the land itself but only in the proceeds of sale, which is personal
property. This section of the California code has no counterpart in
most other jurisdictions, including Illinois and Florida. The effect
is to place full legal and equitable title in the trustee when he has the
981A BOcIMRT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §185 (1951). See also, e.g., Ephriam v.
Metropolitan Trust Co., 28 Cal. 2d 824, 172 P.2d 501 (1946); Smith v. Kelly, 387
Ill. 213, 56 N.E.2d 360 (1944); Union Guardian Trust Co. v. Nichols, 311 Mich.

107, 18 N.W.2d 383 (1945).
992 BOGERT 91; see 4 OHmO ST. L.J. 260 (1938).
10014 Cal. App. 2d 78, 57 P.2d 1363 (1936).
1oSCAL.

CIV. CODE §863 (1949).
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duty to sell and convey. The beneficiary is deemed to have a mere
chose in action - a right to the profits or proceeds of sale. Thus the
stipulation that the beneficial interest shall be personalty does not in
and of itself accomplish a conversion of the beneficial interest to
02
personalty.7
Perhaps the California rule might be labeled "conversion by
statute." The intent of the parties that the land be sold is the key
to the application of the California code, just as it is the key to the
operation of the doctrine of equitable conversion. The California
result hinges to a great degree, however, upon that state's code provision, a factor that would appear to distinguish it from the Illinois
view.
In conclusion, the argument that there can be a conversion by mere
force of agreement is weak. Bogert feels that both Illinois and
California are in effect applying the doctrine of equitable conversion. Unless the doctrine is applicable, it is doubtful whether parties can control the matter by agreement.103 There is authority not
only from California but also from Illinois and other jurisdictions to
sustain his position. 0 4
Florida'sPosition
Although the Florida case law on equitable conversion is relatively
undeveloped, an examination of the existing cases reveals that the
doctrine does exist in Florida, and that the Florida Supreme Court
has adopted some of the generally accepted principles for its construction and application.O5
Christopher v. Mungen 100 established that in order to have a
conversion of real estate into personalty the trustee must have an
absolute duty to sell, because conversion rests upon the principle
that equity considers that as done which ought to have been done.
202Smith v. Bank of America, 14 Cal. App. 2d 78, 57 P.2d 1363 (1936).
1032 BomERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §250 (1953).
104See, e.g., Bartlett v. Gill, 221 Fed. 476 (D. Mass. 1915); Harrison v. Kamp,
395 Il. 11, 69 N.E.2d 261 (1946); Gallagher v. Drovers Trust & Say. Bank, 404
Ill. 410, 88 N.E.2d 870 (1949); Janura v. Fend, 261 Wis. 179, 52 N.W.2d 144

(1952).
105E.g., Hull v. Maryland Cas. Co., 79 So.2d 517 (Fla. 1955); Archer v. Puffer,
146 Fla. 568, 1 So.2d 565 (1941); Mitchell v. Bogue, 142 Fla. 787, 196 So. 306
(1940).
10061 Fla. 513, 55 So. 273 (1911).
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The Court held that a mere discretionary power to sell produces no
such conversion.
In Trotter v. Van Pelt1o° the Florida Supreme Court dealt with
the construction of a will in which the testator directed the executor
to dispose of certain real estate as conditions became favorable for
realizing the full market value. The question was raised whether
this was such an absolute direction to sell as would work an equitable
conversion. The Court held that the intent of the testator controls.
If there is a mandatory duty to sell, "the fact that the trustees are
vested with some discretion as to time, terms, and manner of sale
does not militate against the doctrine of equitable conversion."1°$
In a case dealing with a devise to a testator's widow for life, with
provision for sale of land and distribution of proceeds among certain
residuary legatees upon the widow's death, the Florida Supreme
Court in discussing the application of the doctrine held that under
the provisions of the will the testator contemplated that at the
termination of the life estate the entire estate would be converted
into personal property under the power of sale given the executors. 0 9
Florida also applies the doctrine in contracts for the sale of land,
whereby equitable conversion becomes operative upon the entry
into an agreement to convey title to realty.110 The purchaser is
deemed to become the beneficial owner immediately, and the vendor
retains only naked legal title as security for payment of the purchase
price.
These cases are the only ones dealing with equitable conversion
in Florida. Thus it may not be predicted with any degree of accuracy how the Florida courts will treat an express trust provision that
the beneficial interest shall be deemed personalty. There is an
opinion of the Attorney General, discussed earlier, that expresses
the belief that Florida will follow rules similar to those announced
in the Illinois decisions,"' but this is a rather frail reed upon which

to lean. In order to answer questions concerning the applicability
of equitable conversion to the land trust, the Florida courts will have
to look to other jurisdictions. In view of the contingent nature of
the duties to convey upon direction and to sell at the termination
date of the trust, it is doubtful that the Florida courts will apply the
107144 Fla. 517, 198 So. 215 (1940).
lOSld. at 524, 198 So. at 218.
109Archer v. Puffer, 146 Fla. 568, 1 So.2d 565 (1941).
1boHull v. Maryland Cas. Co., 79 So.2d 517 (Fla. 1955).
111OP. AT'rY GEN. FLA. 056-271 (Aug. 31, 1956).
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doctrine to the Illinois land trust. If they refuse to accept the argument for equitable conversion, it is even less probable that they will
accept conversion by mere agreement. If there is no conversion, the
passive trust of realty will be executed by the statute of uses and the
cestui will have both legal and equitable title.
IS A PASSIvE TRUST OF PERSONALTY EXECUTED?

Assuming that the Florida Court will find an equitable conversion
of the trust res into personalty, will the statute of uses or some other
theory automatically execute the passive trust of personalty and place
the legal and equitable title in the beneficiary?
In Illinois the settled rule is that the statute of usesg1 2 does not
operate upon trusts of personal property, regardless of whether the
trust is active or passive." 3 The rationale of this rule stems from a
provision of the English statute of uses 1 4 that the statute was to
execute estates of those seised with uses, with the result that the
beneficiary obtained the whole legal and equitable title. The courts
feel that the word seised is used in its technical sense; therefore they
apply the statute only to freehold interests in land.1 5 Since an owner
is not seised but is merely possessed of an interest in personalty,
Illinois has held that the statute of uses will not execute a passive
trust of personalty." 6 Illinois is not alone in this view; many of the
several jurisdictions so hold.1 7 Any sense of uniformity, however,
seems to end with the technical application of the statute.
Bogert makes the following observation with regard to passive
trusts of personal property in the modern context:" 8
"While the Statute of Uses applied only to property interests of which one was 'seised' to the use of another, and
2

ch. 30, §3 (Smith-Hurd 1935).
"13Breen v. Breen, 411 Ill.
206, 103 N.E.2d 625 (1952); Craig v. Kimsey, 980 Ill.
321, 118 N.E.2d 895 (1939); Smith v. Smith, 254 Ill.488, 98 N.E. 950 (1912);
Ure v. Ure, 185 I1. 216, 56 N.E. 1087 (1900).
1 ILL. ANN. STAT.

V1427

Hen. 8, ch. 10.

115See 1 ScoTr, TRUSTS §70 (2d ed. 1956).
116Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Mercantile Trust & Say. Bank, 300 Ill.
App.
329, 20 N.E.2d 992 (1939).
"27E.g.,Bellows v. Page, 88 N.H. 283, 188 Ad. 12 (1936); McDowell v. Rees, 22
Tenn. App. 336, 122 S.V.2d 839 (1938); In re Evenson's Will, 161 Wis. 627, 155
N.W. 145 (1915).
'1SlA BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 293 (1951).
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therefore did not affect uses of personal property, modern
courts execute passive trusts of personalty, either by analogy
to the Statute of Uses, or on the theory that any trust without
a purpose is automatically executed."

The views expressed by Bogert are not shared by all the authorities.
Scott contends that the statute does not execute a passive trust of personalty and that the beneficiary must petition in order to compel
termination of the trust and transfer of the title to the trust property. 119 He does recognize, however, that "there is language in a few
decisions to the effect that the Statute of Uses is applicable to per-

sonal property ...."120
In Bellows v. Page121 the Supreme Court of New Hampshire was
confronted with the question whether a testator's will created a valid
trust of personalty, and if so whether the trust was passive and
executed. The trial court found that the will created a passive trust
which would have been executed by the statute of uses if the res
were realty. When the case was transferred to the Supreme Court
there was no indication as to whether the res consisted of realty, personalty, or both, but the court held the trust to be passive and executed. The rationale of the court's holding is found in the succeeding
12
paragraphs of the opinion:
"The statute of uses was passed long before the American
Revolution. . . . It thus, like other similarly enacted statutes,
became part of the body, not of our statutory, but of our
common law . . . . and as such it is susceptible to judicial
change under the maxim cessante ratione lex.
"In sixteenth century England, at the time when the
statute of uses was enacted, there may have been good reason
for drawing a distinction between passive trusts involving real
property and similar trusts involving personalty only, but
today, in this country, and under present conditions, we see no
valid reason why this distinction should be perpetuated."
Although land was the basis of the English economy during the
reign of Henry VIII and personalty was of minor importance, wealth
1191 ScoTT, TRUSTS §70.

120d. at 604.
12188 N.H. 283, 188 At. 12 (1936).
1221d. at 285, 188 At. at 14.
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in the United States today is represented by intangible personalty to
a great extent. Hence there should be strong public policy against
severance of the legal and equitable title to personalty when a trust
is serving no valid or active purpose. When the reason for a law
ceases, the rule should cease or be accommodated to changing times
23
and needs.
In Bowman v. Long, 2 4 one of the oldest cases on point, the Supreme Court of Georgia, in determining the interest of a beneficiary
under a passive testamentary trust of personalty, held that although
the statute of uses applies only to realty, the common law does for
personalty what the statute does for realty. Thus the cestui was
deemed to have both legal and equitable title. In re Lowitz' Estate,125
a Pennsylvania case, held that a will directing the creation of a trust
of $10,000 without limitations or duties created a dry or passive
trust which was executed by the statute of uses. The beneficiary was
held entitled to receive her legacy free from all trust limitations.
The statute of uses is clearly in effect as part of the common law
of Pennsylvania, 2 6 and the Pennsylvania courts appear to derive the
Lowitz result by common law analogy to the statute of uses. 2 7 Tennessee has followed the rule laid down in the Bellows case,128 and
the North Carolina Supreme Court has held that a beneficiary of a
passive trust of corporate stock certificates is entitled to possession of
the certificates upon demand.129 Other jurisdictions following the
view that a passive trust of personalty is executed by analogy to the
statute of uses are Maryland, Mississippi, New Jersey, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, and Vermont. 30 Several states have statutes similar
in effect to the statute of uses' 3' and construe them to authorize execution of passive trusts of personalty.13
'23See 17 B.U.L. REv. 499 (1937).
12426 Ga. 142 (1858).
125360 Pa. 91, 61 A.2d 342 (1948).
l2GKinsel v. Ramey, 87 Pa. 248 (1878); Franciscus v. Reigart, 4 Watts 98 (Pa.
1835).
227See In re Friedheim's Estate, 344 Pa. 542, 26 A.2d 341 (1942); In re Jeremy's
Estate, 178 Pa. 477, 35 At. 847 (1896); McCune v. Baker, 155 Pa. 503, 26 At. 658
(1893).
128McDoweUl v. Rees, 22 Tenn. App. 336, 122 S.W.2d 839 (1938).
129Security Nat'l Bank v. Sternberger, 207 N.C. 811, 178 S.E. 595 (1935).
'3OSee IA BOGERT, TRuSTS AND TRusTEEs 293 (1951). See also Annot., 165 A.L.R.
550 (1946).
132E.g., N.Y. REAL PROi,. LAW §92; WIs. STAT. §§231.05,.14 (1957).
132E.g., Reed v. Browne, 295 N.Y. 184, 66 N.E.2d 47 (1946); Stringer v. Young,
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Florida, as stated previously, has adopted the statute of uses not
only as part of the common law 133 but also in part by statute.134 The
Supreme Court has shown an inclination to execute passive trusts
of personalty by analogy to the statute of uses. In Deauville Corp. v.
Blount13 5 the Court was confronted with the question whether a
trustee of certain corporate stock should be appointed receiver. The
trust instrument limited the trustee in his dealings with the corporate
stock to such an extent that the Court held the trust to be passive and
the trustee a mere agent. It then held: "We find no support for the
contention that the trustee was . . . the owner of the stock.

The

minutes of a stockholders' meeting brought in question indicate that
all stockholders were present .... .""; The fact that the Court indicated that all shareholders were present implies that the beneficiaries were the real owners of the stock. The Court may have been
saying that a passive trustee of personalty does not have title and
that the full title is vested in the beneficiaries.
Aside from the Deauville case, there is little indication as to how
the Florida Court will look upon passive trusts of personalty. It is
difficult to find a reason for not treating a passive trust of personalty
as analogous to one of land for purposes of execution. Since Florida
has adopted the statute of uses as part of its common law, the Court
may apply the maxim cessante ratione cessat lex and execute a passiva
trust of personalty.
MISCELLANEOUS

QUESTIONS

In addition to the aspects of the Illinois land trust discussed, the
use of this hybrid trust may raise miscellaneous questions as to its
validity and applicability under Florida law. Space does not permit
a detailed discussion, but some of these questions are listed below.
(1) Does the trust work a fraud on the inchoate right of
dower in realty of the wife of the beneficiary?
(2) Does it violate public policy by carrying on business

191 N.Y. 157, 83 N.E. 690 (1908); Cutting v.Cutting, 86 N.Y. 522 (1881); Janura
v. Fend, 261 Wis. 179, 52 N.W.2d 144 (1952).
33
1 FLA. STAT. §2.01 (1959).
134FLA. STAT. §689.09 (1959).
13525 So.2d 812 (Fla. 1946).
1361d. at 813.
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activities outside the accepted statutory forms of business
organizations?
(3) Is it invalidated by section 689.07 of Florida Statutes
1959, which provides that the trustee who takes under a deed
"as trustee" takes the fee simple estate when no beneficiaries
are named and the purposes of the trust are not disclosed?
(4) When the beneficiaries join in the execution of the
land trust agreement and give express approval of all the terms
and provisions of the trust instruments, does their consent
constitute the trustee an attorney with power to convey the
trust realty even if the trust is deemed passive and executed by
the statute of uses or analogy thereto?
(5) Will a third party taking a conveyance from the trustee
of a land trust be deemed a bona fide purchaser without notice
of the restrictions upon the trustee's power to convey by virtue
of the trust deed provisions, which expressly provide that third
parties dealing with the trustee are neither privileged nor
required to inquire into the authority for any act of the trustee?
These questions are not exhaustive, but they should be considered
before the Illinois land trust is adopted in Florida.
CONCLUSION

The first objection to the Illinois land trust is that the trust instrument creates a passive trust of realty which is executed by the
statute of uses, resulting in the placing of both legal and equitable
title in the cestui. In rebuttal it is urged, however, that the duties
imposed upon the trustee - the duty to convey upon direction of the
beneficiaries and the duty to sell remaining trust property twenty
years from execution - are active, and that the statute of uses does
not execute an active trust of realty.
If the Court fails to find an active trust, it may be contended
further that by force of agreement and operation of law the trust
realty is converted into personalty and that the statute of uses does
not execute a trust of personalty even if the trust is passive. The
argument against conversion is that the doctrine of equitable conversion does not apply because the time has not yet arrived when
the trustee's duty becomes absolute. There is no conversion of realty
unless the doctrine of equitable conversion applies, because realty
cannot be converted to personalty by mere agreement. It is improper
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to draw an analogy to those cases dealing with partnership agreements
to share profits from land speculation to show an equitable conversion, since the trust agreement expressly forecloses the application of
partnership rules to the trust situation. Therefore there is no conversion, and the trust should be executed by the statute of uses.
If it is held that there has been a conversion of realty to personalty, it may be shown that although, strictly speaking, the statute
of uses does not apply to personal property, most modern courts
hold that a passive trust of personalty is executed by analogy to the
statute.
The Florida Court's reaction to the trust is difficult to predict.
It seems that the lawyer who makes use of this trust device in Florida
under its present status is treading on tenuous legal ground, for, notwithstanding the fact that the Illinois courts have repeatedly held
the trust to be valid, there is well-reasoned authority for an opposite
holding. There are many desirable features of the Illinois trust which,
but for their questionable validity under established trust principles,
would be helpful in the development of Florida real estate. If the
land trust is a desirable device, however, it should be validated
through statutory enactment, not through judicial innovation.
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